Greater security and technological sovereignty for the German 5G mobile network: The Federal Government concludes contracts with telecommunications companies
press release
11 July 2024
5G core networks are to have no more Huawei or ZTE components by the end of 2026 / critical management systems of the two manufacturers are to be replaced in 5G access and transport networks by the end of 2029
Public 5G mobile networks are an integral part of critical infrastructure in the Federal Republic of Germany and are crucial for businesses, industry and the public to ensure that the energy, transport, health care and financial sectors, among others, can function. When it comes to 5G mobile networks, Germany’s security and technological and digital sovereignty are the Federal Government’s highest priority.
Following extensive investigations, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community (BMI) has in recent weeks conducted individual negotiations with mobile network operators Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone and Telefónica on behalf of the Federal Government. The BMI has now reached an agreement with the operators on the further use of critical components in the 5G mobile networks, and contracts under public law are now being signed with all three operators.
The contracts obligate the mobile network operators to stop using all critical components made by Huawei and ZTE in their 5G core networks by the end of 2026. The operators are also required to replace the critical functions of Huawei’s and ZTE’s 5G network management systems in the access and transport networks of the 5G mobile network with technical solutions of other manufacturers by the end of 2029.
Federal Minister of the Interior Nancy Faeser said: “We have examined the risks posed by critical components from Huawei and ZTE in German 5G mobile networks very carefully. We have now reached a clear and strict agreement with the telecommunications companies. These critical components must be removed from the core networks by the end of 2026 at the latest. The critical management systems in the access and transport networks must be replaced by the end of 2029 at the latest. That applies to all 5G networks in Germany, not only to a few key locations.
“In this way, we are protecting the central nervous system of Germany’s businesses and industry – and we are protecting the communication of private individuals, businesses and government. We must reduce security risks and avoid dependence on a single source, unlike in the past. We must become more self-sufficient and resilient.
“The threat environment today underscores the importance of secure and resilient telecommunications infrastructure, especially in view of the risks of sabotage and espionage.”
It was also agreed to establish a forum to jointly work out how the contractual goals can be implemented and promoted. The forum will consist of the Federal Government, all operators of 5G networks, industry partners and manufacturers. It will ensure a structured dialogue on open interfaces, 6G standards, network protection, and information and cyber security.
The Federal Government adopted its National Security Strategy to better protect critical infrastructure such as public 5G networks and to reduce dependence on individual suppliers. Telecommunications networks in particular must be protected from hybrid and cyber attacks, which may quickly turn into an existential threat. Working with trustworthy manufacturers is therefore crucial to avoid critical vulnerabilities and dependencies.
Concluding the contracts with mobile network operators also marks the end of the examinations carried out by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community under section 9b (4) of the Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz).
The Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community examined whether and to what extent public order and security in Germany may be affected by using critical components from Chinese manufacturers Huawei and ZTE in public 5G networks.
The following requirements were examined:
- whether the manufacturer is directly or indirectly controlled by the government, including other state bodies and the armed forces, of a third country;
- whether the manufacturer has been or is involved in activities which adversely affect public order or security in Germany or in another member state of the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty or their institutions; and
- whether the use of certain critical components is in line with the security policy goals of Germany, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty.
Originally published at https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/EN/2024/07/5g-en.html;jsessionid=B7595620C17943D64789B49358E806B9.live861
